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The title of this paper is taken from the description of Singapore as a 'macho-
meritocracy' by Ezra Vogel in his chapter A Little Dragon Tamed (1989). There he 
is talking about the Singapore state's rigorous insistence on meritocratic criteria in 
the allocation of key political roles, and there is a close relationship between this 
principle and the managerial approach taken by the state to all aspects of its citizens' 
lives. What I want to suggest is that the same rigorous stance is taken in managing 
religious diversity - hence, 'macho-management'. 
In examining the extension of controls by the Singapore state over religion 
during the late 1980s, it is first necessary to outline some historical circumstances in 
the emergence of the state, especially during the turbulent years of the 1950s and 
1960s. The period before independence - particularly the 'Malayan Emergency' -
and the contestation with left-wing trades unions and political opponents throughout 
the first years of independence have not only shaped the emerging social and political 
environment of Singapore but have provided the basis for a series of myths to which 
reference is made in mobilising public responses to contemporary events. The term 
'myths' here is used not to imply the fabricated nature of the scenarios presented but 
rather to highlight the importance of their content in legitimating political policy 
and in initiating social action. In this sense the process of constructing myths is 
similar to the 'invention of tradition'(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983); indeed one 
aspect of 'invented traditions' is especially appropriate to a discussion of Singapore, 
since they are seen to be 'highly relevant to that comparatively recent historical 
innovation, the 'nation', with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-
state, national symbols, histories and the rest. All these rest on exercises in social 
engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because 
historical novelty implies innovation' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983:13). 
Two of the most powerful myths are particularly important in managing the 
Singapore state's approach to religion: they derive from the official definitions of 
communalism and communism. The first identifies persistent underlying communal 
tension as a possible source of ethnic conflict; and the second points to an ever-
present conspiracy by communist elements to subvert the state. The potential of 
these two perceived threats to undermine social cohesion was strongly emphasised 
by the state during the period which is examined here. And while this turbulent 
period can be partly understood in terms of Church-State (or more accurately, religion-
state) discourse useful insights can be generated using concepts drawn from the 
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sociology of deviance. (For an account in these terms see O'Grady (1990:55-72)). 
Thus the following account will emphasise the central concept of moral panic and 
the related processes of crisis construction, amplification, and management in order 
to identify some of the factors involved in a series of exchanges between the Singapore 
state and a variety of religious groups. The account focuses especially on the print 
media of the period since this has been an important component of moral panics in 
other societies. 
While there is not space to provide a full historical background, a number of 
key historical features require appropriate attention. First, Singapore's consolidation 
as an independent state can be characterised less in terms of a revolutionary overthrow 
of colonial rule than as a series of initiatives, unanticipated reversals, and exigencies 
to which the political leadership responded in overwhelmingly· pragmatic terms. 
Secondly, most of the political leaders of Singapore in the period leading to the 
formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 did not believe that Singapore 
could survive as a viable, independent nation: as early as 1957, for example, Lee 
Kuan Yew had said that in their contemporary regional context, 'island nations are 
political jokes' (Leifer 1988:344). The People's Action Party (PAP), Singapore's 
ruling party since 1959 (and the only party in parliament from 1969-81), always 
looked to linkage with Malaya as the country's only viable future option. The political 
leadership in Malaya, for its part, held strong reservations about the presence of 
Singapore in a proposed Malaysian Federation because Singapore's predominantly 
Chinese population would counterbalance the Malay ethnic numerical superiority. 
However, the neutralisation of left-wing militancy in Singapore- with its potentially 
destabilising regional effects - provided a decisive motive for federation (Yeo and 
Lau 1989:140), and the inclusion of Sarawak and Sabah- which had significant 
indigenous as well as Malay inhabitants - was seen as diluting the overall Chinese 
influence. Singapore acquired limited self-government in 1959, was incorporated 
into the Malaysian Federation in 1963, but then was expelled and gained full if 
reluctant independence in 1965. It would accurately represent the situation to say 
that Singapore's leaders found themselves in possession of a state they considered 
non-viable without a corresponding nation. 
After the communist faction in the PAP finally split from the party in 1961, 
the moderates faced the task of constructing Singapore's future. Although they had 
originally espoused socialist ideals and the concept of a pan-Malayan nation, the 
shock of expulsion from the Federation in 1965, followed by the announcement in 
1967 of the British military withdrawal - with consequent job losses and more 
precarious security - necessitated a new economic strategy of self-reliance. At the 
same time the political leadership had to articulate for its citizens ·the difficult 
circumstances in which the country found itself; and it is just such a recurring 
insistence by the elite on the precariousness of Singapore's status as a nation-state 
that has formed a central part of its nation-building exercise. The restatement of this 
motif as a major part of the state's legitimation of controls over religion is a key 
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theme of this paper: in practice it represents an 'ideology of survival' (Chan 1971). 
One of the key functions of the modern state, which is constantly under 
challenge, is to provide a strong sense of security, affiliation and personal identity to 
its constituent population (Alter 1989: 123). Furthermore, the stronger the perceived 
need for such affiliation and identity - which is decisively the case when the state 
can point to traumatic political and social upheavals in the past - the greater is the 
state's potential power in demanding compliance and extensive obligations on the 
part of its citizenry. One way of emphasising the citizens' dependence on the state is, 
paradoxically, to create periodic 'crises' which can then be employed to draw attention 
to the state's key arbitrating role. Such 'crises' may take an acute form, such as a 
moral panic or an alarm over security; or they may be part of a longer-term, more 
diffuse crisis over identity. The crisis of identity in many contemporary emergent 
nation-states - as indeed, in the emergent nation-states of nineteenth-century Europe 
(Bowles and Gintis 1987:38; Waldron 1985:428) - is focussed on the state's 
reconstituted definitions of nationality and ethnicity (Benjamin 1988:25). Both acute 
and longer-term types of 'crisis' can be identified in the initiatives taken by the state 
in Singapore to extend its control over the sphere of religion. 
The management of religion which is considered here is based on the political 
elite's fundamentally Hobbesian presentation of the country's history in the 1950s 
and 1960s. In emphasising the 'crisis' and 'survival' motifs, the state constantly 
reminds its citizens that the alternative to its firm control over significant sectors of 
their lives is a reversion to what is portrayed as the anarchy and violence of its early 
days, a veritable 'state of nature'. This image is constantly reiterated, especially 
when there is a perceived need to remind the population - a growing proportion of 
whom have no personal recollection of the incidents that are rehearsed - of the dire 
consequences of disunity. In the aftermath of the 1991 election, for instance, when 
the election of four opposition MPs was seen as something of a rebuff to the PAP, the 
new Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong sketched a scenario of 'Unity in crisis' as the 
only viable option for the future (ST 30.11.91); and immediately before the 1997 
election, when the PAP was targeting an opposition candidate whom they accused of 
Chinese chauvinism, a similar scenario was presented to university students under 
the headlines, Rifts ... Riots ... and nation-building (ST, 6.12.96). 
The Hobbesian picture also reveals a lack of confidence on the part of the elite 
in their citizens, "who are thought not to have attained sufficient political maturity 
to appreciate just how vulnerable their material inheritance is" (Leifer, 1990:27). 
At this point it is necessary to examine some of the conceptual underpinning 
of the account. The term 'moral panic' originated with Jock Young (1971) who, 
importantly for the present argument, introduced it in the course of discussing the 
process of deviance amplification. The concept was taken up by Stan Cohen (1973) 
in his book, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, where it was given considerably greater 
precision. While incorporating popular rumours and anxieties of the type associated 
with urban legends, Cohen was much more directly concerned with the role of the 
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media and with what he called 'the manufacture of news'. This is how he defines 
the concept of moral panic: 
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by 
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited 
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or 
(more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates 
and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and 
at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but 
suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic is passed over and is 
forgotten, ... at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions 
and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in 
the way a society conceives itself. (Cohen 1973:9) 
Some of the features which Cohen identifies in this quotation will be clearly 
evident in the events outlined below; others are either absent or appear in a greatly 
modified form. More recent analyses of the dynamics of moral panics (Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda 1994; Thompson 1998) offer additional insights on the ways in which 
moral panics have been generated, mostly in Western societies, and include some 
observations that would correspond with the distinctive features of the Singapore 
context. 
Examining more closely Cohen's analysis of the media construction of a moral 
panic, there are four components which seem to play a highly important role. They 
are: 
1. EXAGGERATION AND DISTORTION: This includes overestimating 
the numbers involved and exaggerating the seriousness of incidents reported. Very 
often rumour and urban legend are drawn on and substitute for factually-based 
accounts. For instance, the portrayal of rates of youth offending can be exaggerated 
by graphical presentations which change the scale of presentation and thus increase 
the perceived magnitude of the problem. Of course, 'exaggeration'and 'distortion'are 
attributes that are open to competing interpretations; thus it might be preferable to 
use another flawed but less loaded term such as 'disproportionality' (Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda 1994:36) to indicate scepticism about the claimed magnitude of the 
problem. 
2. SYMBOLISATION: Symbols and labels are used to create images 
that are 'sharper than reality', and these are important in identifying 'folk devils' 
who can be blamed for the stigmatised behaviour. Symbolisation is also important 
in mobilising a societal reaction. For instance, in the 1970s in Singapore the 'hippie' 
became a much-publicised 'folk-devil'as a symbol of Western decadence (Roth 
1985:564). In the moral panic over religion in the 1980s symbolisation focussed on 
the two areas of heightened anxiety - communalism and communism - with 
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appropriate icons and images being deployed in the media to highlight their 'sharper 
than reality' characteristics. 
3. MANUFACTURING NEWS: Events and individuals are selected for 
news reporting on the basis of their conformity with previously-established images 
and stereotypes. In their reporting of the perceived danger of religious disruption, 
the Singapore media had constant recourse to previously established images since 
they reiterated 'crisis' scenarios of past history and used these as frames within 
which to locate current events. Prediction is, of course, an important component of 
Cohen's inventory of moral panics (Cohen 1973:38-40) since it supports "the implicit 
assumption ... that what had happened was inevitably going to happen again"(Cohen 
1973:38-40) and would therefore justify the state's 'nipping in the bud' any perceived 
threats. In Singapore this form of historical restatement was seen as particularly 
necessary for a population which is increasingly distant from the traumatic episodes 
concerned, and the educative role of such 'reminders'was reiterated by the political 
elite. 
4. REACTION AND CONTROL: Cohen identifies this final stage of a 
moral panic when, in response to the public anxiety thus created, agents of social 
control - the police, the judiciary, legislators, and in Western societies groups such 
as social workers, and mental health workers - are called on to manage the deviant 
group. This may even leave a lasting trace in legislation, and such a trace may not 
always be of an obviously linked kind: for example, in Britain after the James Bulger 
murder, demands were made for controls to be tightened over violent videos (Newburn 
1997:648). In Singapore, because the state is more closely involved in the rehearsal 
and management of crises, the process of reaction and control is more closely 
integrated into the overall sequence of events. The progress of a moral panic is 
punctuated by the state's insistence on the need for control and on the legitimacy of 
the initiatives taken, however draconian they might appear. As will be seen, the 
eventual outcome of legislative control follows an extensive process of legitimation 
and consensus-building. 
The element of consensus is seen by Goode and Ben-Yehuda as a key indicator 
of moral panic. They point out that shared sentiment may be fairly widespread or 
specific to certain groups in a society - in other words, moral panics differ in extent 
- but that strong public concern is a necessary ingredient. They also refer to 
conspiracies that are 'engineered' or 'orchestrated' by the powers that be, but argue 
that these often fail to materialise or 'simply fizzle out' (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
1994:34). Certainly the construction of the moral panic over religion in Singapore 
can be viewed as a variety of the 'elite-engineered' theory, though without 
incorporating the Gramscian element on which some accounts are premised (Hunt 
1997; McRobbie and Thornton 1995). It is important to note that the Singapore 
government closely monitors the public mood in response to moral panics by 
commissioning opinion polls and engaging in sophisticated social scientific research, 
as detailed below. One further aspect of consensus-building is evident in the media 
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treatment of moral panics and that concerns the status given to claims that were 
reported. In the Singapore media, claims made by official agencies, such as the 
Internal Security Department, are reported as disclosures rather than allegations, 
thus privileging their status as factual; by contrast, in the Malaysian media, reports 
about the same events were always presented as allegations. 
This suggests that we should make a basic distinction between the origin and 
progress of moral panics in a Western and a Singaporean context. In most but not all 
Western examples the 'ownership'of the problem is dispersed among moral 
entrepreneurs as claimsmakers, the media as amplifiers of imputed deviance (though 
sometimes the media provide sceptical commentary on such claims (Jenkins 1992)), 
and the authorities as ultimate repositories of reaction and control. In the Singapore 
context it would be more appropriate to see the state as 'owning' the moral panic 
because it acts in the role of moral entrepreneur and deviance-amplifier - assisted by 
the media, which are largely state-controlled - and subsequently as the legitimate 
source of solutions to the problem. Thus, while in the West the focus of analyses of 
moral panics has been on public concern at the existence of some problem or threat 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:98), in Singapore the process has been more one of 
the state creating public concern in order to justify policies which are seen as necessary 
to meet some putative problem. 
The sequence of crisis-production in Singapore, as this paper's detailed analysis 
will show, contains the three following stages which involve statements by 
government, their encoding and rehearsal in the media, and responses by the relevant 
agencies of social control. 
1. THE RAISING OF SPECTRES: In alerting public consciousness to 
impending disruption, key events or persons (especially the latter) in the country's 
history are identified, their status as folk devils is reaffirmed, and their enduring 
presence as threats to public order is stressed; 
2. THE STATE'S PRECARIOUSNESS: That the folk devils thus 
identified constitute a genuine danger is emphasised by references to the state's 
short history, its turbulent origins; and its weakness and vulnerability as an island 
state in a volatile region; 
3. THE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE: In its constant vigilance over the 
protection of its citizens' security, the state must anticipate such dangers and wherever 
possible prevent their occurrence by any means available: however draconian the 
latter may appear they are necessary and legitimate. Reference is made to the need 
to 'nip in the bud' any such threats. 
The state's responses do not always follow this clear chronology. In those 
situations characterised as acute crises, for example, the pre-emptive strike may 
precede the other stages. Moreover, with the emergence of an increasingly educated 
citizenry, an intervening phase has been inserted into the process as a means of 
establishing the validity and authenticity of the state's diagnosis. Since this stage 
was clearly evident in strategies adopted towards religion in the period 1986 to 
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1991, and since it entails the contributions of academic social scientists, it is of 
particular interest. This stage can be labeled: 
4. VALIDATION AND OBJECTIFICATION: In order to demonstrate 
the existence and extent of the crisis, the state commissions research by university 
sociologists and political scientists whose reports are extensively covered in the 
media; while concurrently it seeks to establish a consensus - that a problem exists 
which needs to be addressed - among the representatives and leaders of groups 
thought to be involved. 
So far most of the conceptual material has been drawn from the sociology of 
deviance, but it is worth emphasising that the process of crisis-management has 
resonances with some of the strategies employed by charismatic leaders, both in 
producing and amplifying crises among their followers and potential followers 
(Tucker 1968:751; Hill1987:169), and in emphasising their followers' dependency 
(Hall1989; Johnson 1979) ). Tucker makes some interesting comments on this process 
of crisis-production and amplification which are appropriate to the Singapore context: 
"[Charismatic leaders] address themselves in one way or another to the predicaments 
that render masses of people potentially responsive to the appeal of a movement for 
change and offer some diagnosis of these predicaments. Indeed, they characteristically 
strive to accentuate the sense of being in a desperate predicament ... ". (Tucker 
1968:751). He then goes on to suggest that crisis-production is not only a strategy of 
charismatic leaders but also a tactic of a variety of consciousness-raising movements. 
In relation to the state's efforts at consciousness-raising, Leifer has drawn attention 
to the distinctiveness of Singapore in a broader Asian context in its emphasis on 
constant 'maintenance' -by which he means not only maintenance of the natural 
environment and physical infrastructure but also of the social and motivational 
domains: "In the way that the environment of Singapore is constantly subject to 
maintenance, so its citizens are constantly instructed and harried in order to prevent 
the political jungle from returning" (Leifer 1990:27). 
Furthermore, there is direct evidence that Singapore's political elite is fully 
aware of the potential functions of crisis-production, particularly in persuading 
younger Singaporeans - who have been socialised in an environment of economic 
success very remote from that of the traumatic period of early independence - of the 
precarious world they inhabit. For example, a minister in the Singapore government 
in 1970 expressed it in the following way: "And one of the things we can do to get a 
little further down the road a little faster is to raise the spectre of total disaster as the 
alternative ..... Within this context, sooner or later [the citizens] will change" (Betts 
1975:141). Crisis-management can be seen as a central component of the ideology 
of survival, which has formed a 'cornerstone concept' of nation-building since 1965 
(Regnier 1991:229-232). It is still fully operational, as the outcome of the 1997 
debacle between Mitl.aysia and Singapore shows. Under the headline, Singaporeans 
now more aware of vulnerability, the Sunday Times (11.5.97) reported as follows: 
"One silver lining has emerged from the diplomatic cloud hanging over Singapore-
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Malaysian relations. Singaporeans now have a keener appreciation of the nation's 
vulnerability and achievements ... ". 
In its claims to geopolitical vulnerability, the Singapore state can point to the 
fact that both of its close neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, have predominantly 
Muslim populations: in addition, the closest neighbour geographically and historically 
is Malaysia, which has a significant Chinese community. The multiracialism which 
Singapore has attempted to institutionalise as part of its process of nation-building 
has as one of its principal goals the prevention of ethnic polarisation, which would 
have inter- as well as intra-state ramifications. Although such polarisation might be 
argued to have been largely nullified or at least contained, the possibility that it 
might occur is one of the prompts with which the state constantly alerts its citizens. 
And in the absence of any overt evidence of inter-communal hostility, religion has 
become a symbolic focus around which such anxieties have been mobilised. 
One fmal element of descriptive background is necessary before turning to the 
analysis of state-religion relationships, and that is to delineate the main contours of 
ethnic and religious diversity. Ethnically, Singapore society has for the past three 
decades contained a relatively stable mix of some 75 percent Chinese, 15 percent 
Malays and 7 percent Indian, and because of the PAP government's policy of 
multiracialism such an ethnic identity must be carried in tandem with Singaporean 
citizenship: in other words, one cannot simply be a 'Singaporean', one has to be a 
'Singaporean XN/Z'. Among the Chinese, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism 
are the major belief-systems or religions; Malays are· almost exclusively Muslim; 
while Indians, who are mostly of Tamil origin, are predominantly Hindu (with a 
small number of Hinayana Buddhists who are tend to be Sri Lankan and Thai in 
origin). Buddhism has recently become more intellectualised, in part as a result of 
Japanese reformist influences, and may see some revival among the younger 
population; but it is Christianity that has shown the most rapid recent growth, 
especially among younger, more highly educated Chinese from wealthier, English-
speaking backgrounds; so that Christians in 1988 were thought to comprise between 
13 and 18 percent of the population, compared with just over 10 percent in 1980 
(Kuo and Quah 1988a; Kuo and Quah et al1988b; Tong 1992:277), while the Muslim 
and Hindu proportions in the population remained stable (ST 14.12.88). 
Conversionism has been a strong motif of the evangelical and charismatic churches 
(whose activities are particularly prominent on the university campus) and it seems 
very largely to have been successful among young Chinese, having had minimal 
impact on the Muslim community (Kuo 1987; Kuo and Quah 1988a; Kuo and Qua 
et al1988b; Tong 1989). 
In the following sections of the paper a number of phases in the construction 
of and response to the 'crises' of religion in Singapore will be identified. These 
phases overlap and sometimes merge, but they can be broadly summarised thus: 
1. LATE 1986 TO LATE 1987: a partly diffuse, partly acute crisis in 
which concerns about fundamentalist Islam and the allegiance of Malay Muslims to 
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the Singapore state were rehearsed; 
2. MID TO LATE 1987: an acute crisis when a group of young, educated, 
Roman Catholic professionals was found by the Internal Security Department to 
have been involved in social action programmes as part of what became encoded as 
a 'Marxist conspiracy', reactions to which continued into 1988; 
3. LATE 1987 TO EARLY 1989: the government drew attention to the 
combined problems of religion and ethnicity and religion and politics, and 
commissioned research by a team of sociologists at the National University of 
Singapore into religiosity, religious conversion, and anomie within the local 
population, the reports from which were presented in late 1988 and reported 
extensively in the media in the early part of 1989. 
4. MID 1989 TO LATE 1990: the government intimated that legislation 
to control religious activities might be necessary, elicited a consensus over the issue 
among religious leaders, and introduced a White Paper on the Maintenance of 
Religious Harmony which went through the formal stages of a parliamentary Bill, 
and was finally passed into law as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 
November, 1990. 
Accompanying the later stages of these initiatives was a government project 
to institutionalise a form of national ideology which became known as the 'Shared 
Values' policy. This was explained as an attempt to impede - once again in the 
interests of national survival - the advance of Western individualism. The project 
will not be discussed in the present paper, but an account of it can be found in our 
book The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore (Hill and Lian 
1995:chap. 8). 
Malay Ethnicity and the Crisis of Islamic Fundamentalism 
The recurring issue of Malay ethnicity and religion - Islam having always 
been a decisive element in Malay nationalism (Firdaus 1984)- became a particular 
focus of concern in late 1986 and early 1987. There had been previous debacles in 
this area: for instance, at the time of separation from the Federation in 1965 a Malay-
language newspaper accused Christians of converting Muslims, precipitating the 
intervention of the Prime Minister and declarations by Christian leaders that such 
conversion had never been their practice (Ling 1989:693). This incident later became 
one of the spectres that could be raised at times of religious dispute. The occasion 
that signalled intense concern in 1986 was the invitation by the Singapore President 
to the President of Israel to visit the Republic. Israel had for many years provided 
military advisers who assisted the training of the Singapore Armed Forces, so there 
were practical relations between the two countries which justified a courtesy invitation; 
and there were also symbolic links, for Lee Kuan Yew had once claimed in support 
of Singapore's federation with Malaysia that in the absence of such an association, 
the country would become 'South-East Asia's Israel'. (Leifer 1988: 342). Full accounts 
of the events of 1986 have been given elsewhere (Lee 1987; Leifer 1988), but of 
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particular interest in the present context is the response to them in Malaysia and the 
Singapore government's utilising of this response. 
In the face of resurgent Islam within Malaysia its Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, 
had adopted an anti-Zionist, even an anti-Jewish stance, and his rhetoric was at its 
height at the time the Israeli Embassy in Singapore announced its President's 
forthcoming visit. What was seen as a personal slight to Mahathir, coupled with a 
more general resentment in Malaysia of Singapore's economic success, led to a 
deeply hostile response in the Malaysian media, including the suggestions that 
Singapore's fresh water supplies, which are piped across the Johor causeway, should 
be cut off; and that the air services agreement between the two countries should be 
revoked. Of particular significance is the Singapore government's use of such 
material, because it shows clearly the process of crisis-production. 
By longstanding convention, newspapers in Malaysia and Singapore are not 
circulated openly on a reciprocal basis in the two countries. The political furore 
expressed in newspaper comment in Malaysia was deliberately carried across the 
Strait of Johor as an act of policy by Singapore's government. Articles from the 
Malay and English language press in Malaysia savagely critical of Singapore were 
reproduced in a press highly sensitive to the priorities of government. For several 
weeks, the newspaper reading public of Singapore was fed on a diet of Malaysian 
invective, including the suggestion that Singapore Airlines would be vulnerable to 
PLO inspired acts of sabotage. It was suggested early on in the episode in an article 
from the Malay language Utusan Malaysia [reproduced in Singapore's Straits Times] 
that "it is important for Singapore leaders from time to time to frighten their people"' 
(Leifer 1988: 348). 
Simultaneously, the Singapore government was concerned to test the opinions 
of its own Malay population and commissioned opinion polls both before and after 
the Israeli President's visit: these showed some degree of disaffection among this 
section of the population (O'Grady 1990:26). 
The occasion for such a raising of spectres and reminder of vulnerability was 
the concern of the Singapore government at a substantial decline in the PAP's popular 
vote in the 1984 general election together with a sense that they were losing touch 
with the electorate. This led, among other things, to the establishment of a Feedback 
Unit in the Ministry of Community Development in 1985: it was the same Ministry 
which initiated research into religion in the late 1980s. There was also evidence that 
younger Singaporeans were becoming complacent about the country's independence. 
Within Singapore itself, it should be noted, Islam has been fully incorporated 
into the state. Under the Administration of Muslim Law Act- in force since 1968-
there is a supreme Islamic Council, the Majlis Ugama Islam, Singapura (MUIS) 
which advises the President of Singapore in matters relating to the Muslim religion 
in the country. Its President is appointed by the President of Singapore. It contains 
the Mufti of Singapore (also appointed by the President of Singapore in consultation 
with the MUIS), five members appointed by the President of Singapore on the 
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recommendation of the government, and at least seven other members appointed by 
the President of Singapore from a list of nominees. Hence consultation between the 
government and Muslim authorities is facilitated at the highest level, and is also 
encouraged at the grassroots level through the agency of community leaders. Such 
consultation was embarked upon in the aftermath of the Israeli President's visit, 
with a forum of Muslim and Malay organisations in January 1987 calling for greater 
government sensitivity towards Malay Singaporeans, coupled with more open and 
mature discussion. One Muslim leader insisted that religious loyalty need not be at 
odds with a Muslim's duty to the nation (ST 18.1.87). Such moves were welcomed 
in newspaper editorials as evidence of growing maturity in the relationship between 
Malay Muslims and the Singapore state (ST 23.1.87) and as a welcome entry of the 
Muslim community into the mainstream of national life (ST 5.2.87). 
Almost immediately, however, the issue was reopened by Lee Hsien Loong, a 
Senior Minister in the government and son of Lee Kuan Yew, who replied during a 
constituency tour to the question why there were no Malay pilots in the Singapore 
Armed Forces in the following way: "If there is a conflict, if the SAF is called upon 
to defend the homeland, we don't want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult 
position where his emotions for the nation may come in conflict with his emotions 
for his religion, because these are two very strong fundamentals, and if they are not 
compatible, then they will be two very strong destructive forces in opposite directions" 
(ST 18.3.87). The statement attracted considerable adverse comment in Malaysia, 
with one political representative in Malaysia accusing the PAP leadership of 
chauvinism (ST 1.3.87). 
The Singapore government's response, articulated by Malay members of the 
PAP, was to view with grave concern interference by foreign (Malaysian) politicians 
in Singapore's internal affairs. Both the assiduous encouragement of the reporting 
of foreign comment, as in the visit of the Israeli President, and the outraged dismissal 
of it, as in the SAF controversy and in various alleged incursions of the United 
States into Singapore's internal politics, have the function of securing the legitimacy 
of the state; on the one hand by highlighting the external threat and on the other by 
emphasising the government's ability to act independently. At all events, this latter 
aspect was re-emphasised in a further statement by Lee Hsien Loong in which he 
recounted the history of ethnic distribution in the Singapore Armed Forces, argued 
that despite intensive efforts at nation-building Singapore society still was not fully 
integrated, as evidenced by reaction to the Israeli President's visit, and concluded: 
"This is a Singapore problem. We will solve it ourselves. Only Singaporeans can 
determine our own future and destiny" (ST 18.3.87). 
The ethnic dimension of the religious problem was further dramatized in June 
1987 with the announcement that on April24, four Malays had been arrested under 
the Internal Security Act (under which detention orders without trial for up to two 
years can be issued) for spreading rumours of impending racial clashes on or around 
May 13 - the anniversary of the 1969 racial riots in Malaysia and Singapore. The 
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announcement of their arrest was delayed until June 3 to forestall disturbances on 
May 13 and because of other Muslim observances at the time (ST 4.6.87). In televised 
confessions two of the four spoke of their involvement in both Malay martial Arts 
groups and Islamic education. The report of the arrest provided an opportunity for 
the Straits Times to raise the spectres of three previous occasions of inter-ethnic and 
religious violence, which it did with the headline, "3 tragic reminders" (ST 4.6.87). 
The accompanying article cited the Maria Hertogh riots of 1950, when a legal wrangle 
over the Eurasian child of Roman Catholic parents who was either adopted or fostered 
by a Malayan woman and subsequently brought up a Muslim led to accusations of 
enforced Christian conversion of a Muslim and riots in which eighteen people died 
and 173 were injured. Aggression was directed against Europeans, and the riots 
were inflamed by strong anti-colonial feelings (Clutterbuck, 1984; Firdaus 1985; 
Hughes, 1982; Maideen, 1989). The Maria Hertogh case has become something of 
an icon in the Singapore state's presentation of its history and was to be revisited on 
subsequent occasions as an instance of the destabilising potential of religious 
conversion. 
The second series of riots occurred in 1965, when Singapore was still part of 
the Federation of Malaysia, and began with a mass religious procession by Muslims 
out of which erupted inter-communal violence between Chinese and Malays: 36 
people were killed and 563 wounded. In 1969 racial riots in Malaysia arising from 
election results which the indigenous Malays interpreted as a threat to their traditional 
position spilled over into Singapore, with four dead and 80 wounded. In cataloguing 
these three historical episodes, the newspaper was framing the current incident within 
a broader scenario of civil disturbance, thus justifying pre-emptive action on the 
part of the security authorities. 
It is appropriate to note that in relation to ethnicity and religion the response 
on the part of the parties involved was to seek some form of consensus over religious 
issues. The different religious groups continued to address themselves to a variety of 
problems (as indeed they had done since the formation of the Inter-Religious 
Organization in 1949): Muslims met Christians to discuss the issue of over-zealous 
evangelism (ST 9.7.87); and MUIS set new rules regulating the invitation of foreign 
religious teachers after an Indonesian religious teacher had given a series of public 
lectures which were regarded as misleading and inaccurate (ST 20.7.87). However, 
as will be seen later, the government's response was to warn about the dangers of 
mixing religion and politics, and in August the banning of four Muslim preachers 
was one of the topics alluded to by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the National 
Day rally (ST 17.8.87). In the following week the First Deputy (and now) Prime 
Minister, Goh Chok Tong, publicly announced that the government was considering 
taking action on religion and minority issues (ST 23.8.87). 
At this stage we can summarise the sequence of events by saying that during 
the first part of 1987 the problem of religious identification and its implications for 
social stability was managed principally in terms of a debate about loyalty to the 
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state and of possible conflicts in relation to Malaysian ethnicity and its identification 
with Islam. From the middle of 1987 the problem of religion was more sharply 
focussed on the perceived links between Christianity and political subversion. 
The Crisis of Christianity and the 'Marxist Conspiracy' 
In extending state management and control over religion, one of the most 
remarkable precipitating events was the 'Marxist conspiracy' which was identified 
by the government in May 1987: the label is one which was immediately attributed 
to the persons and events involved, and it remains the one which is used officially, 
for instance, in the index of Singapore Parliamentary Debates. A brief summary of 
the events is necessary. 
On May 21, 1987, sixteen people were arrested under Singapore's Internal 
Security Act on the grounds of their alleged connection with a clandestine communist 
network: one of the sixteen was a member of the Law Society council. It is worth 
repeating that in dealing with incidents of this kind the Singapore press does not 
qualify government-supplied information with terms such as 'alleged', and thus it 
privileges the state's version as apparent objective fact: by contrast, in reporting 
Singapore-based accusations, the Malaysian press employs qualifiers such as 'alleged' 
and 'claimed'. Initially no details of age, sex, or occupation of those arrested were 
given, only a list of their names (ST 22.5.87), and it was five days before a detailed 
account of the circumstances was provided. Then, the Home Affairs Ministry 
presented a fully constructed presentation of the case against those arrested within 
the context of a Marxist conspiracy. The mastermind of this conspiracy was claimed 
to be Tan Wah Piow, a former student activist who had fled Singapore in 1976 after 
being convicted and sentenced to one year's jail for unlawful assembly and rioting. 
An icon of Wah Piow appeared at the head of the newspaper account (ST 27.5.87), 
and was to reappear in subsequent newspaper reporting of proceedings. In this way 
the public could be reminded of the subversive nature of reported events under the 
leadership of this distant figure. 
The Ministry report contained a diagram showing an alleged network involving 
as its main locally-based organiser Vincent Cheng, a full-time Catholic lay worker 
(ST 27.5.87). He was claimed to be co-ordinating a variety of groups, including the 
Student Christian Movement of Singapore, the Young Christian Workers' Movement, 
the National University of Singapore Catholic Students' Society, Singapore 
Polytechnic Catholic Students' Society, the Justice and Peace Commission of the 
Catholic Church, and a Catholic Welfare Centre whose main activity was to run a 
refuge for Filipino maids. Other groups presented as being part of the network were 
the opposition Workers' Party and a theatre group, Third Stage, which presented 
plays focussing on satire and social comment. The Ministry report also laid 
considerable emphasis on the fact that the majority of those arrested were graduates 
and professionals, and it maintained: 
Singapore now has to contend with new hybrid pro-communist types who 
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draw their ideological inspiration not only from Maoism and Marxist-Leninism, but 
also from the ideas of contemporary militant leftists in the West. They augment 
traditional CPM (Communist Party of Malaya) tactics with new techniques and 
methods, using the Catholic church and religious organizations. This marks a new 
phase in the unceasing communist efforts to subvert the existing system of government 
and to seize power in Singapore (ST 27.5.87). 
If we adopt a social constructionist approach to the media's revelations about 
a 'Marxist conspiracy' -bearing in mind that constructionist analysis always looks 
carefully at the claimsmakers' interests, asking what they stand to gain from making 
the claims and having them taken seriously (Richardson et al. 1991:5) -we find a 
process bearing close similarity to that discussed by Cohen in relation to the 'creation 
of news' in a moral panic. As previously noted, the four stages he identifies are: 
1. EXAGGERATION AND DISTORTION: which includes 
overestimating the numbers involved and the seriousness of incidents; 
2. SYMBOLISATION: or the use of symbols and labels to create images 
which are 'sharper than reality'; 
3. MANUFACTURING NEWS: events and persons are selected for news 
reporting on the basis of their conformity with previously-established images and 
stereotypes; and finally, 
4. REACTION AND CONTROL: as social control agencies (the police, 
the courts, and other powerful interest groups) are involved in managing the deviant 
group: this final process forms the substance of the latter part of the paper (Cohen 
1973). 
Symbolisation was particularly rich in the initial presentation of the 'Marxist 
conspiracy' in the media. A battery of phrases was employed to establish the context 
within which events were to be interpreted: reports were replete with terms such as 
conspiracy, plot, agitator, penetration and manipulation of groups, radicalising, 
mastermind, subversive, chaos, indoctrination, activists, and infiltration (ST 27 .5.87). 
The diagram showing the network of alleged linkages - which always included Tan 
Wah Piow as external mastermind and a Singapore resident, Victor Cheng, as local 
coordinator (ST 27 .5.87)- is similar to those presented in accounts of Special Branch 
operations in the 1950s during the communist Emergency under British rule 
(Clutterbuck 1984), and the headlines confirm the overall interpretation of reported 
events, signalling a "Red threat" (ST 27.5.87), and speaking of "The triumvirate" 
(ST 28.5.87) - a reference to the three key organisations infiltrated by Tan and 
Cheng as they attempted to stir up social unrest, two of which had a religious base: 
the Jurong Industrial Mission, the Student Christian Movement of Singapore, and 
the National University of Singapore's Students' Union. The media also raised the 
spectres of former folk devils who had attempted to stir up left-wing opposition: a 
1970s Euro-communist was recalled, together with a 1970s student activist who had 
links with the Workers' Party (ST 27.5.87). Alleged communist 'infiltration' of the 
Workers' Party in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s was further reported (ST 30.5.87). 
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The Home Affairs Ministry, which contains the Internal Security Department and 
which maintains ongoing surveillance over religious organisations, also reported 
Vincent Cheng's disclosures that he had used the Catholic Church for political ends. 
The issue was extended further into a critique by leading government 
spokespersons of Liberation Theology, which was explicitly linked by these 
spokespersons with events in the Philippines. At the same time the firm actions of 
the state were justified as an examples of the 'pre-emptive strike', with the headline, 
"Government acted to nip communist problem in the bud ... " (ST 2.6.87). 
The consequences of the discovery of the 'Marxist conspiracy' went on for 
over a year. They included televised confessions by those arrested, disciplinary action 
by the Catholic bishop, retractions of their confessions by several of those initially 
detained, further televised retractions of the retractions, and actions against others 
associated with the accused. The political aspects of these events have been widely 
debated. The state's claim to be fragile and vulnerable to threats from communist 
agitators was part of its wider process of legitimation, and was cited as grounds for 
its response by government spokespersons. (See, for example, the letter by the Press 
Secretary to the Minister for Home Affairs in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 
18.2.88:7). The Hobbesian scenario was rehearsed under headlines such as 'Network 
for chaos', once again using icons of Tan and Cheng (ST 30.6.87). 
The other agenda which was closely interlinked with these events involved 
the transition in political leadership from the first generation leadership under Lee 
Kuan Yew to its second generation successors under Goh Chock Tong. In terms both 
of internal PAP politics and of wider legitimacy, it was important for the new 
leadership to show that it was capable of the type of pre-emptive strike which had 
characterised Singapore's first-generation leadership: the incoming Prime Minister 
Goh Chok Tong publicly justified his use of the Internal Security Act, and Lee Kuan 
Yew was at pains to point out that he had left decisions over the conspiracy to the 
younger leaders. Goh himself had no compunction about driving home the political 
message. In a speech to the National Trades Union Congress in 1988, for instance, 
he promised wage rises, but not without political stability. If the political conspiracy 
somehow succeeded, he said, 'you can kiss your wage increases for this year goodbye' 
(Asiaweek 13.5.88: 8). At the same time as this warning was being given, further 
emphasis was placed on the historical dimensions of the crisis, on the one hand by 
explaining the origins of the Internal Security Act in the upheavals of the 1940s and 
on the other by raising the particularly powerful spectre, at least for the first generation 
leaders, of 'The Plen'. The Plen, or Plenipotentiary, was leader of the Communist 
Party of Malaya in the 1950s and represents a potent folk devil of pre-independence 
history: he is still seen as the archetypal subversive (Han et al. 1998:54). 
The identification of alleged subversion within one of the two varieties of 
Christianity which had experienced rapid growth in Singapore, namely a more socially 
activist form of Catholicism (the other being evangelical Protestantism, which the 
state regarded with suspicion because of its conversionist activities, with their potential 
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for inter-ethnic strife) can be seen as an attempt by the state to control autonomous 
mediating structures. These, in the state's view, contain the unacceptable possibility 
of independent political initiatives, especially since they recruit from the more 
educated sections of the population. Thus the Singapore government has sought to 
exercise control over religious groups within the republic while simultaneously 
encouraging their detachment from international contact. In late 1987 the Christian 
Conference of Asia (CCA) - a Protestant body similar to the Catholic Church's 
Justice and Peace Commission - was expelled from Singapore on the grounds that it 
was encouraging 'radical political activities'. In 1988 the Anglican Church in 
Singapore cut its ties with the group, partly because it saw the CCA as supporting 
liberation theology, and later the same year the Singapore Methodist Church did the 
same on the grounds that the CCA was offering a political challenge to government. 
As evidence it was pointed out that the CCA's May 1988 newsletter had referred to 
Lee Kuan Yew, his son Lee Hsien Loong, and incoming Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong as "father, son, and holy Goh" (Asia week, 28.1 0.88:30). Singapore's Anglicans 
had been debating whether they had much in common with the Church of England 
any more, and there had been discussion of breaking away from Canterbury and 
creating an autonomous Anglican Church of Singapore (Far Eastern Economic 
Review 2.7.87:63). 
The Demarcation of the Religious Sphere and Sociological 
Research 
Concern about the implications of increasing religious fundamentalism -
Islamic, Christian, and Buddhist (the latter influenced by the more intellectualised 
movements of Japanese origin as well as by the creation of Buddhist texts for inclusion 
in the secondary school curriculum) - together with deep-seated fears about the 
disruptive potential of conversionism, particularly when it concerned Christian 
conversion of Muslims, but also when Hindus were a target- had been well articulated 
by mid-1987, and government action had been mooted. To this was then added the 
existence of an activist form of Catholicism which was interpreted by the Singapore 
government as an illicit invasion by religion of the political sphere. The response 
was the commissioning by the government of research into religion and religious 
revivalism, to be conducted by a group of sociologists at the National University of 
Singapore. 
One of the concerns behind the commissioning of the reports was a feeling 
among political leaders that the pace of social change in Singapore had outstripped 
the capacity of many people to make sense of their new surroundings - the 'homeless 
mind' phenomenon depicted by Berger, and seen by Benjamin as a strategy ofleaders 
of modem secondary nation-states (Berger et al. 1974; Benjamin 1988:31). The 
perceived problem was conceptualised using a combination of Kornhauser's (1961) 
theory of mass society (Far Eastern Economic Review 10.3.88: 25) and Durkheim's 
(1933) concept of anomie. The concerns are encapsulated in Prime Minister Lee's, 
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Eve of National Day Speech, of August 1987: 
Religion has helped many Singaporeans to keep their bearings in the midst of 
rapid changes in their lives. Growth and progress have made life materially 
much better. But the speed of change has caused disruptions. About 80 percent 
of Singaporeans have been resettled into new homes in new towns. Their new 
homes are better. But they are living in the midst of strangers and in totally 
unfamiliar new surroundings. They miss their relatives and old neighbours and 
friends. They are disorientated. Some feel stress, many feel a sense of loss, a 
rootlessness, a void in their lives. Over time, new ties of friendship and a new 
sense of community will be established. We have now achieved enough of the 
material basics of life to be able to give more attention to socio-psychological, 
and spiritual needs. We must match our economic progress with advances in 
the moral, ethical, and aesthetic dimensions of our life (Speeches, 11:4 1987 :26). 
In the same month a university research team was commissioned to carry out 
a study of religion and religious revivalism in Singapore, and as well as an 
investigation of Christian revivalism and conversion the research specifically included 
anomie as an area of concern. 
The chronology of subsequent events is important because it offers significant 
pointers to the rationale behind the government's approach to religion and to the 
wider question of securing a set of shared core values. Religion was seen to be 
servicing social needs generated by the rapid changes which had occurred in the 
Singapore economy and society. However, its role was viewed by the political 
leadership as problematic in two senses: first, because it might provoke communal 
friction through conversionist encroachments between groups, especially, it was 
thought, as a result of Christian conversion attempts on Muslims which might 
engender inter-ethnic strife. But second, the potential for religion to become involved 
in the area of political action, as claimed in the case of the Roman Catholic social 
activists, brought it into an arena which had previously been substantially monopolised 
by the dominant political group and by grassroots associations associated with it. 
The government's response was twofold: on the one hand it established clear 
parameters to the allowable activities of religious groups and personnel; on the other 
it set out to construct a secularised 'civil religion' to provide a state-sponsored source 
of shared national values. 
As mentioned above, in August 1987 the Ministry of Community Development 
commissioned a research team from the National University of Singapore (NUS) to 
conduct a research report on religion and religious revivalism in Singapore. The 
year-long study involved a literature review (Quah 1987), an analysis of 1980 census 
data (Kuo 1987), case studies on religious revivalism (Kuo and Quah et al1988b), 
and a national survey (Kuo and Quah 1988a). Between December 1987 and October 
1988 a series of six reports were submitted by the NUS researchers to the Ministry, 
and three key ones were released to the press between February and April 1989. 
Their reporting in the press was substantial, with attention being drawn to the 
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important influence wielded by Christians, together with the argument that religious 
trends needed 'careful handling'and a specific focus on evangelism and religious 
switching. Overall, the research findings showed a renewed vitality in Christianity 
and Islam, and they reported some concern among both political and religious leaders. 
Christians in particular were thought to have grown substantially in number, 
especially those belonging to charismatic churches, but there was a significant growth 
in those professing 'No religion' also. In fact it was later to emerge that the figure 
given by the researchers for Christian growth- from 10.3% in the 1980 Population 
Census to 18.7% in the 1988 survey- was inflated as a result of sampling problems, 
and the 1990 Census figure out the Christian percentage at only 12.8 (Tong 1992:277). 
While Islam was in a relatively stable state, there was evidence of a trend towards 
revivalism in Buddhism. Christian conversionist activity was a particular focus of 
concern on the part of members of other religious groups, and given the adoption of 
Christianity by higher-status, English-educated Chinese the problem was seen to be 
one of continuing importance: "They are exerting an influence, politically socially 
and economically, far greater than the number they represent in the population" 
(Kuo et al. 1988b:ll). 
The study's response to the question of whether a high level of anomie in 
Singapore society might account for Christian conversion was negative (Kuo and 
Quah et al. 1988b:18). Using an anomie scale, the researchers found that Singapore 
had a generally low level of anomie and that religious revivalism could not be 
attributed to this factor. (The reporting of this finding in the Straits Times must be 
one of the few occasions when the usually meticulous deployment of appropriate 
social scientific concepts in the print media stumbled, because a journalist failed to 
observe the distinction between 'alienation' and 'anomie' (ST 18.4.88)). 
But the report did recommend the creation of an Inter-Religious Council, and 
it was this proposal which led to the final stage in the management of religion, 
namely reaction and control through legislation. 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
In April1989 Lee Hsien Loong mooted the possibility of legislation to preserve 
religious harmony (ST 1.5.89) and shortly afterwards it was reported that several 
religious leaders were in favour of laws to control religious harmony (ST 10.5.89). 
Here can be seen the process of consensus-creation in the later stage of the moral 
panic over religion, and it should be noted that one important function of the Singapore 
media is to report and construct consensus in relation to major policy issues. 
The sequence of events leading to the passing of the Maintenance of Religious 
Harmony Act (1990) will be summarised briefly, drawing attention to some of the 
significant features in the light of the framework adopted in this paper. 
In late December, 1989, a White Paper on Religious Harmony was released 
(ST 29.12.89). The Internal Security Department had compiled a Report - which 
was annexed to the White Paper- illustrating the problems caused by over-zealousness 
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in religion, and this was fully reported in the media. Again, the theme of nipping 
problems in the bud was reiterated in the Report. In response to the White Paper's 
stated intention to demarcate between religious and political activity, the Catholic 
Archbishop and the Mufti called for a clearer definition of 'politics' (ST 11.1.90), 
though there was also evidence provided in the media of broad acceptance by religious 
leaders of the need for legislation (ST 11.1.90). 
The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill was first introduced to parliament 
on January 16, 1990, and it later became clear that Christian groups would express 
their reservations to the Select Committee. During the debate on the Second Reading 
of the Bill Prime Minister Goh explained that its origins lay in a 1986 report from 
the Internal Security Department about aggressive proselytism by some religious 
groups. A full account of the twin problems of conversion and subversion was 
canvassed in the debate (ST 24.2.90). During Select Committee hearings in September 
1990, two points were constantly reiterated. The first was the need for legislation to 
prevent the kind of riots and public disturbances which had occurred in the past: in 
this context the Maria Hertogh case of 1950 was especially emphasised, with debate 
between government members and the sole opposition member of the Select 
Committee over whether the Hertogh riots were political and anti-colonial- implying 
that they were irrelevant to the current legislation - or, as the government maintained, 
were essentially religious. Secondly, it was stressed that the Bill incorporated less 
severe penalties than the use of criminal law, since it contained the provision that 
the first response to an alleged infringement was cautionary rather than punitive. It 
was pointed out that the decision which sparked off the 1950 riots had in fact been 
made by a judge, so that the argument that the judiciary rather than a government 
Minister should be the arbitrator of decisions over the appropriate boundaries of 
religion was flawed. Another motif which clearly emerged when younger 
Singaporeans appeared before the Select Committee was their awareness of the violent 
potential of religious disruption, despite their not having lived through the traumatic 
episodes to which reference was constantly made. 
The Bill was finally passed in November 1990 (ST 10.11.90). Its first main 
provision was the creation of a Presidential Council for Religious Harmony containing 
a majority of representatives of the major religions in Singapore, its function being 
to monitor religious matters and to consider orders made against individuals. The 
second main provision was to empower the Minister to issue restraining orders against 
an official or member of a religious group who was suspected of causing antagonism 
between such groups, or engaging in activities to promote a political cause. Breaches 
of such restraining orders rendered a person liable to a fine or term of imprisonment 
or to both. 
Conclusion: State Management of Religion, Instrumental 
Rationality and Spheres of Competence 
This paper has shown how the state in Singapore has constructed a number of 
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key myths in order to legitimate political policy and to mobilise social action, 
especially with the goal of creating consensus. These 'inventions of tradition' have 
provided symbolic points of reference in the periodic episodes of crisis-management 
in which the state has been engaged. The concept of moral panic, previously deployed 
only in Western contexts, provides a valuable framework for understanding the 
dynamics of such episodes. In particular, the 'ownership' of moral panics and their 
deployment by the governing elite as a strategy of social 'maintenance' and policy-
formation has been highlighted. It remains to set this analysis in a broader context 
by linking it with some key underlying features of Singapore as a managerial state, 
and to point to some strong resonances with Weberian notions of bureaucratic 
rationality. 
Singapore's culture is dominated by instrumental rationality and its government 
pursues overwhelmingly pragmatic policies. For instance, when policies reveal 
unintended consequences they are rapidly thrown into reverse, as happened with the 
religious education policy in the 1980s (Hill1997). We have labelled this a 'Return 
to Sender' process (Hill and Lian 1995:13-140). Instrumental rationality contains a 
well-articulated notion of 'spheres of competence' and of rule by experts. These 
principles have been most clearly stated in Lee KuanYew's strictures on academic 
freedom which, he argues, is founded upon three principles: 
First, that the teacher was a technical expert in his field. Second, that his search 
for truth and knowledge was disinterested. Third, that teachers in a university 
did not just transmit knowledge to successive generations: they were expected 
to advance the frontiers of human know ledge and widen the dominion of man's 
mind ... Within his province, his freedom was supreme. But his special status 
did not extend to fields wherehe was not the competent disinterested explorer. 
And one of those fields was the heat and dust of the political arena (Josey, 
1974: 72). 
The coincidence of these views with those of Max Weber on 'ethical neutrality' 
are immediately striking. In The Methodology of the Social Sciences (1949:5) Weber 
notes: "Today the student should obtain, from his teacher in the lecture-hall, the 
capacity: ( 1) to fulfil a given task in a workmanlike fashion; (2) definitely to recognise 
facts, even those that may be personally uncomfortable, and to distinguish them 
from his own evaluations; (3) to subordinate himself to his task and to repress the 
impulse to exhibit his personal tastes or other sentiments unnecessarily"; in his 
essay 'Science as a Vocation' (Weber 1970:146) he notes: "The task of the teacher is 
to serve the students with his knowledge and scientific experience and not to imprint 
upon them his personal political views". 
Weber indeed thought that university teachers had the same opportunities as 
other citizens for pursuing their ideals through political action, and should not demand 
further privileges. The professorial chair is not a 'specialised qualification for personal 
prophecy' (Giddens 1971:144). 
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There is complete consistency in the Singapore political elite's notion of politics 
as an area of specialised expertise, since the selection of PAP candidates for election 
entails a scientific screening, to which since 1980 have been added an IQ test and 
other psychological tests with the goal of eliminating candidates who are self-
interested (Clutterbuck 1984:352). Vogel had this in mind when he characterised 
the political system in Singapore as a 'macho-meritocracy' (Vogel1989:1053). 
The principle of specialisation of function is applied in exactly the same way 
to religious institutions, which are seen as having no legitimate role in political 
debate and activity. The values conveyed by religious institutions are seen as 
appropriate to the private sphere only, and thus the operation of such institutions as 
mediating structures is substantially curtailed. As Lee Kuan Yew has expressed it: 
A religion looks after the spiritual, moral and social well-being of its followers. 
But religious organisations should leave the economic-political needs of people 
to non-religious groups, like political parties. This is because if any religious 
group tries to define the socio-economic agenda of Singapore and mobilises the 
grass-roots by 'social action programmes', other religious groups will do 
likewise. Once people are mobilised on socio-economic issues on the basis of 
religious loyalties, the consequences will be bad for all (Lee 1988:13). 
Given this degree of demarcation by the state over the permitted sphere of 
competence of religion, one response on the part of religious groups has been in the 
direction of increased intellectualisation and rationalisation. Tong suggests that the 
abandonment of traditional forms of Chinese religion by younger, better-educated 
Chinese has been motivated by the belief that traditional forms are superstitious and 
illogical (almost, one might paraphrase, untidy). By contrast, Christianity may well 
be seen as more orderly and systematic (Tong 1992:284-291). In a similar way, 
Buddhism has been able to maintain its appeal by becoming more rationalised and 
canonical (Tong 1992; Kuah 1991). 
Part of the reason for the preference shown by younger Singaporeans for more 
rationalised forms of the world religions has been the impact of more systematic 
versions taught as part of the school curriculum (Tong 1992:290); but these in turn 
have been influenced by the concern on the part of the state to establish a specialised 
and constrained sphere of competence for religion. This is entirely consistent with 
its rationalised approach to other areas of economic, legal, political, and social life. 
In tracing the extension of the state's capacity for surveillance and social control 
into areas of private commitment which might legitimately claim autonomy, we are 
manifestly looking at a process which should not be regarded as the exclusive preserve 
of a managerial state. An entirely similar response has been identified in Western 
societies, especially in response to the growth of New Religious Movements. Beckford, 
citing Robertson, has observed that in the United States there is a growing 
contradiction "between, on the one hand, the long-standing assumption that acceptable 
forms of denominational religion are functional for national identity or integration 
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and, on the other, the emerging idea that religion is best understood and practised as 
a matter of private conviction. It is as if religion is tolerated only on condition that it 
is civic-minded and confined to private spirituality" (Beckford 1993:131). 
Hence, if New Religious Movements in the United States put their religious 
convictions into political, social, or economic practice, they are open to the charge 
that they have breached a putative wall between religion and politics. "Collective 
expressions of religion, below the level of some overarching civil religion," he 
continues, "have allegedly become problematic" (Beckford 1993: 131 ). This 
assessment of the paradox facing religion in a Western context could be transposed 
in its entirety to the religious environment of contemporary Singapore. In that 
environment not only are religious movements of a novel or sectarian kind regarded 
with mistrust and sometimes proscribed, but more 'mainstream' forms of religion 
are seen as containing a potential for problematic forms of collective activity and 
therefore as requiring surveillance and regulation. The conversion and subversion 
motifs of the moral panic surrounding religion in Singapore in the late 1980s have 
their counterparts in other societies in which the contemporary global revitalisation 
of religious fundamentalism and proselytism have intruded upon religion-state 
relations (Kepel 1994). 
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